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ConstitutionalisIll:
The Chinese Experience

Frank F. Wong
One of the great hopes and great failures of American policy in East Asia has been the
unswerving effort of successive administrations to establish a constitutional and
democratic government in China. President Roosevelt's strong support of Chiang
K'ai-shek's government in the early 1940's was based on the premise that China would
eventually emerge in the post-war years as a strong constitutional democracy, firmly
allied with the United States. Even when this premise proved to be sadly mistaken, when
China emerged as a totalitarian Communist state rather than a constitutional democracy,
many Americans refused to alter their basic assum ption that China could have and should
have become a nation with a constitutional and democratic form of government.
During the McCarthy era in the 1950's, there was a raging political debate over how
the United States had "lost" China. Those who charged that China could have been saved
by more active U.S. intervention in the Chinese Civil War assumed that the original
premise of Roosevelt's policy was valid. In 1954, when the United States, on the initiative
of John Foster Dulles, concluded a bilateral defense treaty with Chiang's government in
exile on Taiwan, there was an implicit belief that Communist rule in China was temporary
and that one day Chiang might restore in China conditions conducive to the development
of constitutional democratic government. Today, United States policy toward China has
not basically changed from that initial purpose of containing and isolating a presumably
temporary and illegitimate government on mainland China.
But perhaps it would be useful to examine the original assumption of America's China
policy; the belief that China, with American aid, could and should establish a
constitutional democracy in China. The question needs to be considered within a broader
historical context. A study of modern China points to one inescapable conclusion: there
are many historical continuities even in the revolutionary regime of Communist China.
For example, such phenomena as rule by a small, educated elite, insistence on political
and cultural orthodoxy, and political domination over border areas are all characteristics
of traditional Confucian China as well as contemporary Communist China. This suggests
that China has a basic internal dynamic that is determined more by her centuries of
adherence to Confucian Imperial government than by such late-arriving external forces as
American policy. Before Americans flagellate themselves over their failure to establish
constitutional democratic government in China, they need to ask whether this form of
government, as it is understood in this country, was indeed an appropriate model for a
modern China that was still deeply influenced by Confucian traditionalism.
Some light can be shed on this vexing question by examining an earlier period of
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Chinese history when the fIrst effort was made to install constitutional government in
China. The problems of this era were clearly reflected in the career of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
who was one of the earliest and staunchest advocates of constitutional government in
China. Liang's life spanned the period from 1873 to 1929. He became involved in politics
when the last Confucian dynasty was at its fInal gasp and he participated in a signifIcant
reform movement that was deeply influenced by Western political ideas. His own
education was in the traditional Confucian mold. As a young boy he studied and
memorized the Confucian classics. As a young man he aspired to the traditional
Confucian career as a government offIcial. He completed the government sponsored
examinations which provided the usual path to appointment and advancement in the
Imperial bureaucracy. Thus, during his formative years, much of his outlook was shaped
by values and basic assumptions of the Confucian canon that he had studied for years.
But this Confucian education proved to be inadequate for the extraordinary times in
which Liang lived. In 1895, the Chinese Empire suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands
of the upstart Japanese in a war over Korea. Liang, with a number of other young
scholars, joined a study group led by K'ang Yu-wei which was concerned with discovering
the reasons for China's humiliating weakness in dealing with foreign powers. One of the
fIndings reached by these scholars was that Japan's unprecedented strength was due in
large measure to their adoption of a western style constitutional government. They
concluded that China should also adopt such a constitutional government in order to
achieve political parity with rival foreign governments. By 1898 Liang had studied various
forms of constitutional government in the West and he began to advocate the
establishment of representative assemblies and constitutional government in China.
Liang continued his ardent advocacy of constitutional government throughout a
critical period when China saw the breakdown of the traditional Confucian Imperial
system and Chinese leaders began to grope for a new political alternative to replace it. His
e~rly advocacy of constitutional reform and his association with K'ang Yu-wei led to his
flight into exile in Japan in 1898 when the Empress Dowager usurped the authority of
the reformers' sponsor, the Emperor Kuang Hsu. While in Japan, Liang became even more
widely known as a constitutional reformer and his articles were read both on the
mainland and among Chinese students studying abroad in Japan. When the Ch'ing
dynasty abdicated in 1912, Liang returned to China and participated in the ostensibly
constitutional government of Yuan Shih-k'ai. But when Yuan began to manipulate the
constitution and maneuver for his own enthronement as Emperor, Liang discovered how
inadequate constitutionalism was for China at that time. Eventually, he retired,
disillusioned with politics, and devoted himself to research and writing.
Thus we can observe that Liang was not only one of the earliest advocates of
constitutional government but he was also involved in the initial effort to establish
constitutional government in China and its dramatic failure. Because he was both a
Confucian educated man and an advocate of Western constitutional government in a
crucial period of Chinese history, he embodied in his thought and career the dilemmas
posed by the imposition of constitutional forms on a society that continued to have
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residual Confucian influences. One principal dilemma which plagued him throughout his
career helps to explain why constitutional government failed to take root in China.
This dilemma can be stated simply: Confucian political philosophy is based on the
belief in government by men but constitutional political philosophy is based on a belief in
government by law. For centuries in China, Confucian educated intellectuals have
believed that good government depended on having good men in government. Political
leaders with wisdom and character were more important in promoting good government
than immutable laws or formal institutions. An ideal government was ruled by a Sage
Ruler, a morally impeccable Emperor who embodied all of the Confucian virtues. The
Confucian point of view always subordinated law to morality. According to
Confucianists, it was useless to establish excellent laws if the officials administering them
were morally corrupt. Thus, as the Confucian Imperial system developed, the government
in general and the Emperor in particular had virtually no legal or institutional restraints
upon the exercise of their political power. They had only the self restraint imposed by
their Confucian morality.
Constitutional government was based on an entirely different premise which was
basically inconsistent with the central notion in Confucian politics. In the
Anglo-American political tradition, it was assumed that good government could be best
assured by having a written or unwritten constitution which defined the structure of the
government and delimited the sphere of authority exercised by each part of the
government. Constitutions were associated with the rise of representative bodies which
were able to check the arbitrary use of power by a monarch or an executive authority .
Thus Americans have always spoken about a government of checks and balances, or
government by law rather than government by men. Here the system of government was
of primary importance and the morality of individual men was much less critical.
Constitutional restraints would insure that the authority of government officials would,
in the long run, be checked whether or not they were of good character.
Liang struggled with this basic dilemma as his own view on constitutional government
altered with the changing political situation in China. In the period from 1898 to 1910,
he advocated constitutional monarchy as the best model for a reformed Chinese
government. Although he was regarded as a radical subversive by the Imperial court in
China, he was basically a moderate reformer. He believed that gradual development of
constitutional government should take place within the structure of the existing
government. He explicitly opposed revolutionary methods of changing the structure of
the government and thus he refused to join Sun Yat-sen's T'ung-meng hui, an
organization dedicated to overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. Ironically , Liang, by
advocating constitutional monarchy and gradual reform , was actually preserving the
Imperial family which had made him a fugitive in his own country.
This incongruous position, in my opinion, was an expression of his intellectual
compulsion to embrace somehow both the Confucian premise concerning government by
men and the Anglo-American assumption that there should be government by law. It was
the basic dilemma inherent in the introduction of constitutional government into China.
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Liang hoped that an enlightened Chinese Emperor would appear who would voluntarily
introduce constitutional restraints upon his own authority. A Western style government
would be established by traditional Chinese methods: a Sage Ruler would create a
constitutional government and the reforms would come from the top down. 1
Unfortunately, Liang's hopes were ill founded. In 1906 the Manchu dynasty, under the
leadership of his political rival, the Empress Dowager, did indeed introduce a program of
gradual establishment of constitutional monarchy. But it was something less than
enlightened. A group of Manchu officials were sent abroad to study the constitutions of
foreign countries. The constitutional reform program which they recommended to the
Imperial court was designed to strengthen the authority of the Emperor rather than
restrain it. 2 It was a coarse perversion of constitutional government as it is understood in
the Anglo-American tradition. Not surprisingly, the Manchu constitutional reform
program failed to stem a rising tide of political opposition among the Chinese. In 1912
the Imperial family was forced to abdicate and a republican government was established
by a coalition of Yuan Shih-k'ai's military faction and Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary party.
The republican revolution caught Liang by surprise and undercut the monarchical
foundation of his constitutional program. Moreover, his relations with the two major
political factions that spearheaded the revolution and organized the subsequent
government were something less than cordial. Yuan Shih-k'ai had betrayed the Reform
Movement of 1898 in which Liang had participated and Sun Yat-sen's revolutionaries had
constantly ridiculed his reform views in Japan. Nevertheless, Liang, by virtue of his
writings on reform, was a political hero with a significant following of his own. He
became the leader of a moderate coalition party, the Chin-pu-tang, through which he
hoped to influence the republican government for which he had neither planned nor
hoped.
In the coalition government formed after the revolution, Yuan Shih-k'ai was installed
as President of the Republic while Sun Yat-sen's party, now called the Kuomintang,
dominated the National Assembly. From the beginning it was a suspicious and
uncomfortable partnership. The Kuomintang hoped that the Constitution , which they
had largely designed, would effectively check the executive power of the President, Yuan
Shih-k'ai. Yuan, on the other hand, backed by his army and financial support from the
Western Powers, waged an incessant campaign through bribery and terror to liquidate the
power of the Kuomintang. By 1913 he had succeeded in outlawing the Kuomintang and
in 1914 he altered the Constitution to suit his own ambitious designs. Where did the
moderate Liang Ch'i-ch'ao stand in this crossfire between rival extreme factions?
Interestingly enough, Liang, from his middle position, gravitated toward the authoritarian
Yuan Shih-k'ai and away from the more democratic Kuomintang. Although he had earlier
turned down an invitation from Yuan to join his government, Liang, in 1913 joined
Yuan's cabinet as Minister of Justice and also served on a special constitutional planning
committee. It was an incongruous and ill advised decision and yet an understandable one.
Liang's willingness to serve Yuan Shih-k'ai during this crucial period was another
indication of how this devout constitutional reformer was still wedded to the Confucian
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concept of the priority of men over law in politics. Liang was not a militarist but he was a
monarchist and Yuan, at least, was a strong executive who would be able to maintain and
establish order. In Liang's view, the Kuomintang, with its undisciplined republicanism,
encouraged anarchy and disorder. In the pinch, he instinctively sided with the man rather
then with a set oflaws or a constitution. True , Yuan was something less than a Sage Ruler
but a good Confucian assumed that any ruler was educable. Liang apparently hoped that
from his cabinet position he could induce the gradual constitutional reform under an
enlightened and re-educated ruler that he originally had in mind.
Unfortunately, Yuan was not educable. In 1915, Liang watched in dismay as Yuan
covertly organized a movement aimed at restoring Imperial government and establishing
himself as the new Emperor. On the surface it would have seemed that Liang would
welcome such a move. He had, after all , long been an advocate of constitutional
monarchy and this was the form of government which Yuan planned to establish after his
coronation. But Liang had come to realize that Yuan regarded constitutionalism in much
the same way as the Manchu reformers: a constitution was principally a tool to
strengthen the authority of an Emperor rather than a means of circumscribing executive
power. This realization led not only to Liang's resignation from Yuan's cabinet but it also
inspired him to lead a rebellion against Yuan's government in an effort to stop the
Restoration movement. 3 This was the supreme moment of irony in Liang's career. All
his life he had argued against revolution and for change within the existing political
framework. Now he led an armed insurrection against the existing government which was
purporting to implement the constitutional monarchy which Liang had long advocated.
Yuan died of natural causes in 1916 and the Restoration movement collapsed. Liang
then briefly returned to Peking and attempted to continue his political career with Yuan's
successor, Tuan Ch'i-jui. But Tuan , with his warlord mentality, was an even less likely
candidate for a Sage Ruler than Yuan . In 1919 Liang retired from the political arena and
devoted himself to studies of Chinese history and philosophy. During the final decade of
his life, Liang turned increasingly to traditional Confucian values and developed a new
skepticism about the value of Western political theories and institutions. He was no longer
ambivalent on the question of whether China should have government by men or
government by law. In one of his later books, written in 1924, Liang associated
constitutional government with the ancient Chinese philosophy of Legalism and then
declared them both inferior to Confucian political philosophy. He recalled the disorder
that had prevailed in China a decade earlier despite the existence of a constitution and
cited this as proof of the Confucian adage: "There are men who govern but there are no
laws that govern ... 4 The great crusader for constitutionalism had repudiated the primary
importance of government by law.
What does Liang's career tell us about the Chinese experience with constitutionalism?
In one sense, his ultimate conclusion about constitutional government foreshadowed the
subsequent development of Chinese politics. Liang, in his own way, had declared that
personalism rather than constitutionalism was the basic framework for Chinese politics.
Today, few informed observers would doubt that both the Communist government on
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the mainland and the Nationalist government on Taiwan are dominated by the
personalism or personality cults of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang K'ai-shek. Although both of
these governments have nominally established constitutions, the Nationalists' in 1947 and
the Communists' in 1954, in neither case has the constitution been the primary guiding
force of the government. The Communist constitution does little more than sanction the
monopoly of political power by the Communist party which , of course, has been largely
dominated by Mao Tse-tung. Although the Nationalist constitution would normally place
restraints upon President's Chiang's power, since 1948 there has been a declared state of
emergency for the duration of the "Communist rebellion" and the President enjoys
extraordinary powers during this period. Only the President can end the state of
emergency. This being the case, Chiang is virtually unchallenged in his domination of
Nationalist politics.
In summary, it is possible to conclude that despite the radical transformations which
modern history has wrought upon the traditional civilization of China, one basic
continuity is the traditional Confucian impulse toward government by men. So long as
that impulse persists, government by law, in terms of the Anglo-American tradition, is
not only an improbable but an inappropriate alternative.
1 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Li hsien-fa" (On Establishing a Constitution) in Yin-ping shih ho-chi (Complete
Works from the Ice Drinker's Studio) 40 vols., Shanghai, 1936.

2 Sun E-tu Zen, "The Constitutional Missions of 1905- 1906" in Journal of Modern History XXIV
(Sept. 1952).
3 Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840- 1928 trans. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls
(Princeton, 1956) pp. 326-332.
4 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, History of Chinese Political Thought During The Early Tsin Period, trans. by L.T.
Chen, (New York, 1930) p. 72.
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